s5pv210 datasheet_system_BOOTING SEQUENCE

6 BOOTING SEQUENCE
6.1 OVERVIEW OF BOOTING SEQUENCE
S5PV210 consists of 64KB ROM and 96KB SRAM as internal memory. For booting, internal 64KB ROM and
internal 96KB SRAM regions can be used. S5PV210 boots from internal ROM to enable secure booting, which
ensures that the image cannot be altered by unauthorized users. To select secure booting or normal booting,
S5PV210 should use e-fuse information. This information cannot be altered after being programmed.

S5PV210由64KB的ROM和96KB的SRAM作为内部存储。在引导阶段，内部64KB的ROM和96KB的SRAM内部程序存储器区域可以使用。

S5PV210启动从内部ROM启用安全启动，这确保镜像不能被未经授权的用户更改。选择安全引导或正常启动，

S5PV210应该使用的保险丝的信息。此信息在烧录后不能被修改。

The booting device can be chosen from following list:

•General NAND Flash memory
• OneNAND memory
• SD/ MMC memory (such as MoviNAND and iNAND)
• eMMC memory
• eSSD memory
• UART and USB devices

可从以下列表中选择启动设备：

•通用NAND闪存

•OneNAND存储器

•SD / MMC存储（如moviNAND，，）

•eMMC存储

•全部记忆

•UART和USB设备

At system reset, the program counter starts from the iROM codes in internal ROM region. However, the system

reset may be asserted not only on booting time, but also on wakeup from low power modes. Therefore, the iROM
code must execute appropriate process according to the reset status (refer toTable 6-1).

在系统复位后，程序计数器从内部ROM区代码开始。然而，系统复位可以生效不仅启动时间，而且还从低功耗模式唤醒。

因此，iROM代码必须按复位状态执行相应的过程（见表6-1）。

The boot loader is largely composed of iROM, first and second boot loaders. The characteristics of these boot

loaders are:
• iROM code: Contains small and simple code, which is platform-independent and stored in internal memory
• First boot loader: Contains small and simple code, which is platform-independent and stored in external
memory device. Related to secure booting.
• Second boot loader: Contains complex code, which is platform-specific and stored in external memory device.
If you select secure booting, iROM code and first boot loader provide integrity checking function (that is it uses
public key algorithm) to verify loaded image. There are 160 e-fuse bits of secure boot key, and they are used to
authenticate loaded public key before the iROM’s integrity check. For more information on secure booting, refer to

Chapter.

引导程序主要是由iROM、第一和第二引导装载程序组成。这些引导程序的特点：

•IROM代码：包含小而简单的代码，它和存储平台独立存储在内部存储器中，

•第一引导加载程序：包含小而简单的代码，它是独立于平台的，并存储在外部存储装置。与安全引导相关。

•第二引导加载程序：包含复杂的代码，它与特定平台有关并且存储在外部存储设备中。

如果你选择安全启动，iROM代码与第一引导装载程序提供完整性检查功能（即使用公钥算法）验证加载镜像的。有160位安全保险丝启动密钥，并用

验证加载公钥在iROM的完整性检查。有关安全启动的更多信息，参见章节。

6.2 SCENARIO DESCRIPTION
6.2.1 RESET STATUS
There are several scenarios for system reset such as hardware reset, watchdog reset, software reset, and wake
up from power down modes. For each scenario, the mandatory functions are summarized inTable 6-1

6.2场景描述

6.2.1复位状态

有几个方案的系统复位，如硬件复位，看门狗复位，软件复位，并唤醒

从掉电模式。每一个场景，强制功能列于表6-1

6.2.3 FIXED PLL AND CLOCK SETTING
To speed up first boot loader’s operation, the first boot loader initializes the PLL with fixed value. Fixed PLL setting
is as follows:

6.2.3固定PLL和时钟设置

加快第一引导装载程序的操作，首先引导装载程序初始化锁相环为固定值。固定的PLL设置内容如下：

6.2.5 SECURE BOOTING
The basic criterion for security system is "The ‘root of trust’ has to be hardware. You cannot request a software
system to ‘validate’ itself.”

安全系统的基本准则是“信任的根本”必须是硬件。你不能要求一个软件系统“验证”本身。

In S5PV210, the root of trust is implemented by iROM code in internal ROM. Therefore it cannot be modified by
unauthorized users. The hardware design proves the integrity of iROM code. On the other hand, the first boot
loader, the second boot loader and OS images are stored in external memory devices. Therefore, the iROM code
(that has already been proved as secure) should verify the integrity of first boot loader. If the integrity check
passes on first boot loader, the first boot loader is included in trust region. Then, first boot loader verifies the
integrity of the second boot loader, the second boot loader verifies the integrity of the OS image.

在S5PV210，信任根是通过从内部ROM代码不能被修改来实现的，因此它不能被未未经授权的用户修改。

硬件设计验证了iROM的完整代码。另一方面，第一次开机装载机、二次引导装载机和操作系统映像存储在外部存储设备中。

因此，iROM代码的（已被证明是安全的）应验证第一引导装载程序的完整性。如果完整性检查

通过第一次引导装载程序，第一次引导装载程序包含在信任域中。然后，第一引导装载程序验证

第二引导加载程序的完整性，第二引导装载程序验证操作系统映像的完整性。